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Non-technical Summary
Union membership in Germany has shown remarkable variation during the last two
decades. While after the German unification union membership increased considerably,
the German trade unions have suffered from a continuous decline since 1992. Union
membership was at 13.7 millions in 1991 and it decreased to 10 millions in 1999. Union
density, as the ratio of union membership to employed workers, has exhibited cyclic
movements since the formation of trade unions in the nineteenth century. However,
the present downward sloping trend of union density in most Western countries, which
has taken place with short interruptions since the mid–1970s, causes a debate over the
future prospects of trade unions in a post–industry economy. In Germany, the recent
mergers of industry oriented unions are a response to the radical changes the unions
are confronted with.
In order to assess the economic importance of unions and their bargaining power in the
relevant industries, it is necessary to know the union density among employees. The
officially available information about gross trade union membership is not sufficient in
this regard because the numbers on union membership do not distinguish by employ-
ment status and industries. In addition, as of 1991 membership information is usually
published only for unified Germany.
This paper analyzes the determinants of the propensity to join a union and examines the
stability of the estimated union membership function over time. Obtaining evidence on
the latter, we attempt to shed light on the question to what extent the ongoing decline
in union membership can be explained by intertemporal changes in the workplace and
firm specific environment, and in socioeconomic variables. We use four waves of the
German Socioeconomic Panel in 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998 to perform a panel analysis
of net union membership among employees and we estimate a correlated random effects
probit model suggested in Chamberlain (1984) to take proper account of individual
specific effects. By using a block bootstrap estimator for the covariance matrix of the
first stage estimator, we robustify Chamberlain’s estimator.
As an indicator of the importance of unions, we estimate the share of unionized (em-
ployed) workers at the industry level by projecting the estimated union membership
function based on the IAB employment subsample, a large data set of employees in
West Germany.
Our empirical results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to be a union
member has not changed considerably over time. Therefore, the aggregate decline in
membership is due to composition effects. We also find a strong decline of net union
density at the industry level during the 1990’s based on the predicted union membership
for the IAB employment subsample, i.e. the composition effect is also strongly working
within industries. Our results suggest that unions have not become more attractive for
the types of workers who traditionally have a low propensity to be a union member
and whose share has been increasing continuously over time. In order to stop the
decline in aggregate union membership, unions would have to be much more successful
in recruiting these types of workers.
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1 Introduction
Union membership in Germany has shown remarkable variation during the last two
decades. While after the German unification union membership increased considerably,
the German trade unions have suffered from a continuous decline since 1992. Union
density, as the ratio of union membership to employed workers, has exhibited cyclic
movements since the formation of trade unions in the nineteenth century. However,
the present downward sloping trend of union density in most Western countries, which
has taken place with short interruptions since the mid–1970s, causes a debate over the
future prospects of trade unions in a post–industry economy. In Germany, the recent
mergers of industry oriented unions are a response to the radical changes the unions
are confronted with.
This paper analyzes the determinants of the propensity to join a union and examines the
stability of the estimated union membership function over time. Obtaining evidence on
the latter, we attempt to shed light on the question to what extent the ongoing decline
in union membership can be explained by intertemporal changes in the workplace and
firm specific environment, and in socioeconomic variables. In this context, we test the
stability of the propensity to join a union or to stay in a union over time. Rigorous
tests of stability over time have rarely been implemented in the literature. A recent
study for Germany, Schnabel and Wagner (2003) estimates membership equations for
different years, however, without testing for the significance of the differences over time.
The decision of a utility–maximizing individual to join a union can be explained as a
result of a cost–benefit analysis. The membership decision is determined by monetary
and non–monetary advantages and disadvantages. In the German context, monetary
benefits of a union membership are relatively low compared to the membership fees.
Monetary incentives of a union membership (strike payments) that might exceed the
costs of joining a union are mainly restricted to selected industries in several regions
(“Pilotbezirke”), where the wage bargaining process typically starts, and strikes some-
times occur.
However, many services provided by unions can be viewed as public goods among
employees. Wage settlements bargained at the industry level are usually relevant for
all workers independently of their union membership status and closed shops are legally
prohibited in Germany. For this reason, a free–riding behavior of workers seems to be
rational. In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policy, there must
be other non–monetary incentives to join a union (see Goerke and Pannenberg, 1998,
Lorenz and Wagner, 1991, Schnabel, 1989, 2003, Schnabel and Wagner, 2003). We are
taking into account selective incentives provided by unions as well as firm and industry
related information.
Another issue addressed in this paper is the approximation of the actual strength of
unions and their bargaining power in the relevant industries. The officially available
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information about gross trade union membership is not sufficient to measure their
importance on the labor market. First, the data published by trade unions usually do
not distinguish between employed and non–employed members (Franz, 2003). Second,
those unions which are organized in the German trade union association (“Deutscher
Gewerkschaftsbund”) are present in several sectors of the economy. Third, as of 1991
membership information is usually published only for unified Germany. For these
reasons, the available aggregated data cannot provide an appropriate indicator for the
actually strength and significance of trade unions for the German labor market. In
order to provide such an indicator, we estimate the share of unionized (employed)
workers at the industry level by projecting the estimated union membership function
based on the IAB employment subsample (IABS), a large data set of employees in
West Germany.
This paper extends upon the earlier study in Fitzenberger et al. (1999) which con-
ducted a panel analysis of union membership in West Germany based on the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1985, 1989, and 1993. This study used a
GMM–estimator suggested by Avery, Hansen and Hotz (1983) in the empirical work.
Here, we use a longer period by including the year 1998 and we are implementing a
correlated random effects estimator suggested by Chamberlain (1984) in our empirical
analysis. This estimator takes account of a potential individual specific correlation be-
tween unobserved individual specific effects and past, present, and future values of the
regressors. By using a block bootstrap estimator for the covariance matrix of the first
stage estimator, we robustify Chamberlain’s estimator. In Fitzenberger et al. (1999),
the older version of the IABS restricts the prediction of the union membership rates
to the period until 1990. Here, we use the new version of the IABS that has only
recently been made available enabling us to project our estimates up to 1997. There-
fore, this study allows for a detailed analysis of the trends in union membership after
German unification. Our results indicate, that the propensity to join a union for an
employee with given characteristics has not changed significantly over time, but rather
the composition of the workforce and the industry structure is mainly responsible for
membership losses of German trade unions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the recent
trend in gross total union membership in West Germany. The theoretical arguments
why individuals join a trade union are discussed in section 3. Section 4 presents the
econometric model. The estimation results for the determinants of being member in
a trade union based on the German Socioeconomic Panel can be found in section
5. Section 6 uses the estimates put forward in this paper to predict net union density
based on the IAB employment subsample. Section 7 concludes. The appendix provides
detailed information on the data and the empirical results.
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2 Trends in union membership in West Germany
Table 1 shows the development of trade union members for the most important central
union associations that publish reliable data. Whereas the four unions considered could
increase their stock of members between 1960 and 1980 according to the overall increase
of employment, the number of union members remains relatively constant in the 1980s.
As a result of the German unification the biggest unions could considerably increase
the number of their members. After 1991 the DGB suffers from the largest decline in
membership. At the end of the 1990s, we observe a stabilization at a low level.
Table 1: Members of central union associations in thousand 1960–1999a
Jahr DGBb DBBb DAGb CGBb sum.c
1960 6378 649 450 200 7762
1970 6712 720 461 190 8203
1980 7882 821 494 288 9486
1981 7957 820 499 294 9572
1982 7849 812 501 297 9459
1983 7745 801 497 299 9344
1984 7660 794 497 306 9259
1985 7719 796 500 307 9323
1986 7764 782 496 307 9350
1987 7757 785 494 307 9344
1988 7797 786 496 306 9387
1989 7861 793 503 304 9462
1990 7937 799 573 309 9619
1991 11800 1053 584 310 13749
1992 11015 1095 578 315 13004
1993 10290 1078 527 310 12207
1994 9768 1089 520 306 11684
1995 9354 1075 507 303 11239
1996 8972 1101 501 303 10877
1997 8263 1117 489 303 10172
1998 8311 1184 480 303 10278
1999 8037 1202 462 305 10006
a: Until 1990 for West Germany, afterwards for all Germany, in 1000.
b: DGB = Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DBB = Deutscher Beamtenbund, DAG
= Deutsche Angestelltengewerkschaft, CGB = Christlicher Gewerkschaftsbund
c: Members of the police union are also included in the sum in 1960 and 1970, even
though they do not belong to the DGB.
Sources:
German Statistical Office (“Statistisches Bundesamt: Statistisches Jahrbuch fu¨r
Deutschland”).
DGB (1999): (“DGB: http://www.dgb.de/dgb/mitgliederzahlen/mitglieder.htm”).
The interpretation of these statistics is quite problematic, because the published in-
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formation about union members is not very reliable (Schnabel and Pege, 1992, p.13f,
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft, 1994. p.8, Schnabel, 1993). Moreover, unions only
publish aggregate data for employed and non–employed members, and the membership
information refers to all of Germany since 1991, restricting the comparability of the
data before and after German unification.
In contrast to the absolute number of union members, the union density allows for a
more meaningful evaluation of the importance and strength of unions. Throughout this
paper we will call the ratio of union members relative to all employees in the unions’
sphere of influence as the gross union density (GUD). The GUD can be calculated
based on data from official statistics. However, the GUD overestimates the importance
of trade unions in the labor market, because the numerator includes individuals who
cannot appear in the denominator, for example unemployed people, retired workers,
and students. What we are really interested in is an indicator of the importance and
strength of unions in the labor market related to active (employed) members. For this
reason, the net union density (NUD), which includes exclusively employed members
in the numerator, seems to be the more appropriate reference number. Now, the
problem in calculating the NUD is caused by the fact that the number of employed
union members will not be published. In addition, a single union cannot be assigned
unambiguously to the various industries, and sometimes there are several unions active
in one industry. Even the assignment of the single union member to an industry is
often unknown.
There are only a few studies which attempt to calculate the NUD at the industry
level for Germany. Armingeon (1988) calculates the NUD for several industries until
1985. Lorenz and Wagner (1991) attempt to estimate the NUD for 29 manufacturing
industries by multiplying the estimated coefficients based on individual data with the
means of the corresponding industry variables. However, the authors neglect industry
specific fixed effects in their regressions. We take account of these effects and project
the resulting estimates for 46 industries from 1985 to 1997 using a comprehensive
individual data set.
3 Determinants of trade union membership
Why do people join a union? In the anglo–american countries, there exist direct eco-
nomic incentives for workers to become a union member (Bain and Elias, 1985, Fiorito
et al., 1986). In these countries workers may be forced to join a union in order to
get or to keep a job (closed shop). In addition, to be a union member often increases
expected earnings. For example, for the U.S., Freeman and Medoff (1984) conclude
that unionized workers earn significantly more than their non–unionized colleagues.
However, direct economic incentives of a union membership are usually irrelevant for
workers in Germany. This is the case for several reasons: First, wage settlements are
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relevant for all workers within a firm that is a member of the employers’ association and
closed shops are legally prohibited. Second, via the so called coverage extension rule
(“Allgemeinverbindlicherkla¨rung”), firms that are not member of the employers’ asso-
ciation can also be forced to adopt wage settlements by the government. Third, unions
are restricted in discriminating between members and non–members by law (“negative
Koalitionsfreiheit” based on article 9(3) of the German constitution). Fourth, em-
ployers tend not to discriminate non–unionized workers in order to prevent them from
becoming union–members. These theoretical arguments are also empirically supported
by Goerke and Pannenberg (1998), who find for Germany no significant impact of a
union membership on earnings.
Nevertheless, there are plausible determinants of union membership. First of all, unions
provide some selective incentives. For example, unions take the role of an insurance.
They grant strike pay, take the risk of law–suits with the employer, and provide other
services like legal advise exclusively for members. However, these incentives do not
seem sufficient in explaining the rationale for paying the fairly high membership fees
related with union membership. Moreover, influencing the unions’ policy is usually not
possible for a single union member. This problem was already emphasized as a central
theme in Olson’s theory of the “Logic of collective choice” (Olson, 1968). Second,
in addition to economic incentives, the social dimension of a membership decision is
deemed important. Social custom, reputation benefits, prestige, philosophy of life, and
conformity to internalized norms may also be motives for joining a union (Corneo, 1995,
Goerke and Pannenberg, 1998, Windolf and Haas, 1989). Under certain circumstances
social coerce, in particular in “traditional” unionized industries like miners and steel
workers, might be sufficient to move workers into a union. Without discussing these
hypotheses in detail, our empirical analysis attempts to consider such non–economic
motives of union membership. We use various socioeconomic variables which may be
relevant for the importance of selective incentives or indicating social and vocational
environment and the individual philosophy of life.
In light of the theoretical discussion of the determinants to join a union, we will shortly
discuss the likely impact of several variables used in the empirical analysis in section 5.
The various possible determinants of union–membership may be very different among
workers. For some individuals, one motive may dominate their decision to join a
union, but usually several reasons co–exist. The relevant variables are structured in
three categories. First, individual characteristics and attitudes are relevant “intrinsic
motives” for the need of protection , the choice of changing the job, and the costs caused
by a job change (“exit” option). Second, the costs of establishing a union and providing
services for their members depend on the composition of the workforce and firm or
sector related conditions. Third, the monetary costs in the form of membership fees, as
well as the non–monetary benefits and costs arising from the social environment at the
working place, the presence and strength of unions and their acceptance by employers
and employees are further important determinants of joining a union. In the following,
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we differentiate between personal variables (1–6), a mix of individual and working place
related variables (7–10) and firm specific conditions (11–12). The empirical analysis
investigates the impact of these variables on the individual propensity to be a union
member.
1. Age: The mobility of workers and the relationship to their working place may
depend on the age of the worker. It is conceivable that elderly workers are tied more
strongly to their job due to higher firm specific human capital and have a lower mobility
caused by family ties. Union membership may increase job security since factory
committee members, which are usually union members, are commonly involved in
dismissal decisions. However, a correlation between the age and union membership
may be due to cohort effects. Differences in the value orientation between generations
may be responsible for different attitudes about unions or the kind of social custom
and the pressure to join or to stay in a union.
2. Education: A higher skill–level is usually connected with a higher professional
position and a closer relationship to management. On the one hand, the resulting higher
individual labor performance also decreases the need of protection. On the other hand,
higher education may be positively correlated with workplace related involvement of
the worker and an increasing need of consultation and participation.
3. Sex: In general, females are less tied to the labor market due to family reasons and
their lower average income compared to males, who are usually the prime earner in the
household. For this reason (married) women are less affected by the possibility of a
job loss. Moreover, in the past the unions’ policy was mainly directed to the needs of
males.
4. Marital status: Married workers are also responsible for their family, especially
if they have children, and their mobility is restricted. For these reasons the need of
protection should be higher for married people. On the other hand, if one partner in
the marriage looses his/her job, the other partner could help to get over the period of
unemployment. Overall, we expect that the former arguments dominate the latter.
5. Foreigner: The linkage of foreigners to the German labor market is often assumed to
be weaker. However, unions are often attempting to avoid discrimination of foreigners.
6. Value orientation: Unions are traditionally closely linked to the social democrats
through their common history and ideology. But being a large party, parts of the
christian democrats have also close ties to the unions. We only consider the preference
towards these two main parties in our empirical analysis as dummy variables (none of
the two as third alternative).
7. Wage: Although benefits from a union membership typically do not dependent
upon wages, membership fees are proportionally increasing with wages. With regard
to monetary costs the propensity to join a union should decrease with increasing wages.
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In addition, higher wages are – as well as a higher education – usually linked with a more
superior position in the firm and a higher responsibility decreasing the probability of a
union membership. However, higher wages are also an indicator of firm specific human
capital, increasing the costs of loosing or changing the job. We expect a hump shaped
relationship between wages and union membership. The effect should be positive for
low wages and negative for higher wages.
8. Employee status: Unions traditionally emerged as organizations of blue collar work-
ers. The relatively homogeneous preferences of blue–collar workers also makes is easier
to organize them (see Hirsch/Addison, 1986, p.59). White collar workers are assumed
to be closer to their employer. However, a higher expected desire for information
and participation at the workplace may increase the activity of white collar workers
in unions. There are also differences of expected union density with regard to work-
ing time, since the part–time working employees exhibit less attachment to the labor
market. It is also more difficult to organize them.
9. Job Satisfaction: Dissatisfied workers often seek support by the union. If the em-
ployee recoils to debate with the employer, the work council responsible for workplace
related issues and its members are often themselves union members. In addition, the
probability of demanding legal advise or financial support in the case of a law–suit with
the employer is higher for workers who are unhappy with their working conditions. In
addition to their “exit” option, employees can opt for “voice” via union membership.
If the union manages to support their members and adequately increase their satis-
faction, the opposite effect of a positive correlation between union membership and
workers satisfaction is possible. The theoretical prediction of the sign of the effect is
ambiguous.
10. Tenure: The connection to the workplace probably increases with the time of em-
ployment in the firm. On the one hand, a longer employment duration also strengthens
the identification with the job and the loyalty towards the employer, thus decreasing
the probability of joining a union. On the other hand, unions already had more oppor-
tunities to recruit the employee for their organization. Overall, the sign of the impact
of tenure is also ambiguous.
11. Firm size: Due to fix costs, average organizational costs decrease whit firm size.
The opportunity for a “voice” option is also negatively correlated with the firm size.
Larger companies often have a Work Council or Supervisory Board, both which benefit
the activities and the acceptance of unions. The larger the firm the higher are the
opportunities of rent–sharing between firms and unions in the goods markets and the
greater the extent of wage bargaining in the labor market. For all these reasons, union
activities and union density should be positively correlated with firm size.
12. Industry: Unions are traditionally strong in the manufacturing industry. In the
public service, unions are accepted by employers, especially where the Social Democrats
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are in office. In the growing private service sector, the establishment of unions is more
difficult due to more rapid changes in the industry, less homogeneous interests of the
employees, and a higher opposition of employers. The competition in goods and labor
markets also varies over industries and more competition limits the possibility for rent
sharing between firms and workers. Moreover, capital accumulation differs considerably
between industries. A higher capital intensity causes a lower labor elasticity increasing
the scope of union bargaining and union density. In addition, strong unions might give
rise to a more capital intensive production.
4 Correlated Random Effects Probit Model
This section presents the econometric framework that we use in the empirical analysis.
The goal is to estimate the probability of being a trade union member for employed
workers. In order to take account of the panel structure of the data and to consider
unobserved individual specific effects which might be correlated with the regressors, we
estimate a correlated random effects probit model suggested by Chamberlain (1984). In
the previous section, we discussed various variables as potential determinants of union
membership. A number of these variables are likely to be correlated with unobserved
individual characteristics thus suggesting the estimation of a random effects model
allowing for such correlation. While it is beyond the scope of the analysis to explicitly
model all endogeneous variables in the absence of a sufficient number of instruments,
our approach takes account of the potential endogeneity of explanatory variables in a
flexible way.
Consider the following multivariate probit model for individuals i = 1, ..., N in periods
t = 1, ..., T :
yit =
{
1 if y˜it ≥ 0
0 else
(1)
with y˜it = βxit + ci + uit. The distribution of (ui1, ..., uiT ) conditional on {xi1, ..., xiT , ci}
is multivariate normal with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ = (σjk), {j, k = 1, . . . , T}.
We observe (xi1, ..., xiT , yi1, ..., yiT ) for a large number of individuals, whereas ci is not
observable. The individual specific (fixed) effect ci can be interpreted as individual
characteristics such as motivation or attidudes towards life. It is assumed that these
characteristics are correlated with past experience and future expectations and that
they are stable at least over the sample period.
Based upon the distributional assumptions concerning the residuals (ui1, ..., uiT ), we
obtain the following probit model:
P (yit = 1|xi1, ..., xiT , ci) = Φ[σ−1/2tt (βxit + ci)](2)
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where Φ(.) is the standard normal distribution function and σtt is the t
th diagonal
element of Σ.
Because our panel consists of T = 4 years, there exists an incidental parameter problem
if we want to estimate all the ci. Therefore, we consider a correlated random effects
estimator suggested by Chamberlain, which is based on the following linear specification
for the distribution of ci conditional on xi:
ci = λ1xi1 + ...+ λ4xi4 + vi(3)
where the distribution of vi conditional on xi1, ..., xi4 is N(0, σ
2
v). Specification (3) im-
plies a strong restriction, since the regression function E(ci|xi1, ..., xi4) is linear and we
assume homoskedastic and normally distributed error terms. The resulting distribution
for yit conditional on xi1, . . . , xi4 has a probit form:
P (yit = 1|xi1, ..., xi4) = Φ[αt(βxit + λ1xi1 + ...+ λ4xi4)](4)
with αt = (σtt + σ
2
v)
−1/2. Combining the 4 equations yields the following matrix of
coefficients:
Π = diag{α1, ..., α4}[βI4 + ιλ′](5)
=

α1(β1 + λ1) α1λ2 α1λ3 α1λ4
α2λ1 α2(β2 + λ2) α2λ3 α2λ4
α3λ1 α3λ2 α3(β3 + λ3) α3λ4
α4λ1 α4λ2 α4λ3 α4(β4 + λ4)

where ι = (1, 1, 1, 1)′, λ = (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4)′, and α = (α1, α2, α3, α4)′.
For the period–by–period probit regression of yit on the set of regressors in all periods,
we have
P (yit = 1|xi1, ..., xi4) = Φ(pit1xi1 + pit2xi2 + pit3xi3 + pit4xi4).(6)
Note that only time-varying regressors can be introduced as regressors for each period.
The first step of the estimation procedure suggested by Chamberlain (1984) consists of
estimating these period–by–period probit equations. Also note that with a sufficient
number of time–varying regressors, it is possible to estimate the model with time–
varying β coefficients.
The structural parameters β, α, and λ are then estimated in a second stage by a
minimum–distance approach since the first stage pi–parameters are functions of these
structural parameters. As usual in a probit model, it is not possible to identify all
scale parameters (α1, α2, α3, α4). However, the ratios
αt
α1
, which satisfy the following
nonlinear restrictions :
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αt
α1
=
pitt + pit1
pi11 + pi1t
(t = 2, ..., T )(7)
are identified, if β + λ1 + λt 6= 0. We use the scale normalization α1 ≡ 1 in order to
identify the parameters of interest.
The second stage of the minimum distance approach involves the minimization of
[vec(Πˆ)− f(β, α, λ)]′W−1[vec(Πˆ)− f(β, α, λ)](8)
with respect to β, α, and λ, where α1 is set equal to one, vec(Πˆ) is the vector of all
elements in the estimated matrix Πˆ = (pˆij,k), {j, k = 1, . . . , 4}, and f(β, α, λ) represents
the corresponding vector of the elements of the matrix in equation (5). The weighting
matrix W is the variance–covariance–matrix of vec(Πˆ) estimated in the first step.
As an innovation, we use a design–matrix bootstrap procedure in the first stage where
we resample the entire observation vector for an individual. We then estimate cross–
sectional probits for each year based on the resample. If at least one of the 4 nonlinear
cross–sectional regressions do not converge we draw another resample and restart the
regressions. Overall, we use 1000 valid resamples to construct a robust covariance ma-
trix. We use this bootstrap procedure for the following reasons. First, the bootstrap is
likely to provide a better estimate in finite samples since the conventional estimate is
based on an asymptotic approximation for a nonlinear estimator. Second, by drawing
the entire observation vector for a given individual when forming the resample, the
estimated variance–covariance–matrix takes account of remaining individual specific
autocorrelation in the error term. Note that such autocorrelation does not invalidate
the consistency of the cross–sectional probit estimates or of the entire estimation ap-
proach. Third, by basing the resample estimates for all four cross–sections we can
automatically estimate the potential covariance between the pi–estimates for different
periods.
5 Empirical Results
We estimate the probability of a union membership based on data from the German
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998. The goal of
the analysis is to investigate the stability over time. The data set and the variables used
are described in detail in the appendix A. We construct an unbalanced panel of 6623
individuals. The composition of the sample is shown in tables 2 and 3. We estimate a
correlated random effects probit model as presented in section 4. This estimator enables
us to make use of the panel structure of the data and to take into account unobserved
individual specific effects which might be correlated with the regressors. This way,
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we identify the components of an unobserved individual fixed effect, which can be
interpreted as a “long term” characteristic of the individual and “short term” impacts
(λ’s) of this fixed characteristic. Correlations between the cross–section estimates are
considered explicitly by including also past and future values of time varying regressors.
The variance–covariance matrix including the covariances between all coefficients in all
years is obtained through a bootstrap procedure. Before analyzing the stability of the
membership equation over time, we investigate which regressor variables are related to
the individual specific effect, i.e. for which variables we find significant λ coefficients.
Applying a series of Wald tests of the hypothesis that the estimated λ’s are jointly
equal to zero suggests the following assessment of the variables used (here and in the
following, we use a significance level of 5 %).
1. Variables unrelated to the individual specific effect:
FEMALE, FOREIGNER, AGE, MARRIED, APPRENTICESHIP, ABITUR, UNI-
VERSITY, SEMI–SKILLED and SKILLED BLUE–COLLARWORKER,WORK-
ING PART–TIME, CHRISTIAN–DEMOCRAT, SATISFACTION, and industry
dummies.
2. Variables related to the individual specific effect:
EARNINGS, SOCIAL–DEMOCRAT,WHITE–COLLARWORKER, CIVIL SER-
VANT, TENURE, and FIRM SIZE.
The results of the Wald tests are not reported here but are available on request. Note
that the first group comprises also all time invariant regressor variables for which λ’s
cannot be estimated.
In order to characterize the changes over time, it is important to examine to what ex-
tent the variation in union membership is caused by changes in its determinants or by
changes in the impacts of these determinants on union membership. In principle, there
are two possibilities of time varying coefficients for a time variant regressor. First, the
relationship with the individual specific effect can vary over time (λ’s) as mentioned
in the previous paragraph. Second, the direct impact of a ceteris paribus change of
the regressor for a given individual (β’s) can change over time. When investigating as
to whether the propensity to be a union member is stable over time for an individ-
ual with given observed characteristics and given individual specific effect, we have to
analyze the second possibility, i.e. to test for the stability of the β–coefficients over
time. For all regressor variables displaying no significant variation of their year specific
coefficients β we restrict the coefficient to be equal over time. In contrast to Fitzen-
berger et al. (1999), who found no statistical evidence for a variation of the estimated
coefficients over time, our results indicate a small number of significant changes of co-
efficients across the considered years. We present results for three specifications of the
union membership equation where specification 1 uses only personal characteristics as
regressors, specification 2 involves those regressors available in the IABS data (i.e. the
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prediction of the net union density NUD for the IABS is based on this specification),
and specification 3 uses all available personal and firm characteristics as regressors, see
section 3.
The set of regressors for the three specifications are the following (see tables 2 and 3
for the variable definitions):
• Specification 1: FEMALE, FOREIGNER, AGE, MARRIED, APPRENTICE-
SHIP, ABITUR, UNIVERSITY, CHRISTIAN–DEMOCRAT, SOCIAL–DEMO-
CRAT, status as blue–collar or white–collar worker, PART–TIME, SATISFAC-
TION, EARNINGS
• Specification 2: Sector affiliation, Firm size plus the same as specification 1 except
for SATISFACTION, CHRISTIAN–DEMOCRAT, SOCIAL–DEMOCRAT
• Specification 3: Sector affiliation, Firm size plus the same as specification 1
In addition, all specifications include year specific dummy variables for missing values
in earnings and satisfaction (only specification 1 and 3). The final versions of the
preferred specifications are presented in table 6. They are the outcome of the following
procedure. We estimate all specifications allowing for year specific β–coefficients for
all regressor variables (having set λ to zero for all regressor variables where λ proves
not significant). Based on this specification, we performed Wald tests regarding the
stability over time of the β–coefficients for different regressor variables. The results
of these tests can be found in table 7. The preferred final specifications in table 6
restrict all those coefficients to be constant over time for which table 7 does not show
a significant test statistic.
The problem of endogeneity should not be very serious in our regressions. As already
mentioned, a causal effect of union membership on earnings is hardly conceivable in
Germany. Political orientation and satisfaction with work might be endogenous to some
degree. These variables are excluded in our specification 2 used for the prediction of
union density at the industry level based on the IABS. Furthermore, specification 2 is
driven by the fact that the IABS only contains information if an employee is a white–
collar worker or a blue–collar worker or if (s)he is part–time working. Since it is not
possible to identify a part–time working white–collar worker or blue–collar worker the
employee status variables in specification 2 correspond to this information.
We start with the interpretation of the results for specification 1 involving the indi-
vidual’s characteristics as determinants of union membership. A lower probability of
a union membership for females and part–time workers corresponds to the theoretical
expectations, see section 3. The negative sign of FOREIGNER seems to strengthen the
conjecture that foreigners are less tied to the German labor market. The signs of the
age variables indicate a concave impact of the age with a maximum at about 50 years.
The education variables ABITUR and UNIVERSITY show the expected negative, but
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mostly insignificant, impact, whereas an APPRENTICESHIP is positively, but also
often not significantly, correlated with the probability of being a union member. Not
surprisingly, preferences for the social–democratic party are positively correlated with
union membership, whereas an orientation towards the christian–democratic party ex-
hibits a negative, but insignificant sign.
Only for semi–skilled blue–collar workers in specification 1 and 2, we find the expected
positive impact and for part–time workers the expected negative sign in all specifica-
tions. However, the empirical results indicate no clear significant relationship between
being a blue–collar worker (interacted with skill level) and union membership. Some
significant changes over time appear quite erratic and are difficult to interpret. Sat-
isfaction with the job seems to be negatively correlated with the propensity to join
a union, but only in specification 3 this relationship is highly significant. For gross
earnings, we can not find any systematic impact. The other variables, which are also
possible determinants of earnings, already seem to affect union membership decision.
Firm size exhibits a significantly positive effect on union membership and, notably,
the coefficients change significantly over time. These changes are not monotone but if
anything then union membership in large firms seems to increase over time.
Summing up, we do not find significant and consistent changes in the β–coefficients
over time which can explain the decline in union membership. If anything, the reported
changes tend to go into the opposite direction.
6 Prediction of net union density based on IABS
For the purpose of predicting net union density (NUD) at the industry level, speci-
fication 2 discussed in the previous section includes only such variables that are also
available in the IAB employment sample (IABS). Based on specification 2, we predict
the individual probability of being a union member using about 3.1 million observations
during the period 1985–1997 available in the IABS. Because of the quite good statistical
fit of specification 2, the prediction here should be more accurate than the prediction
in Fitzenberger et al. (1999) for an earlier time period. Lorenz and Wagner (1991) also
predicted their empirical results based on the GSOEP data from 1985 for 29 industries
using the corresponding average aggregate values at the industry level. In contrast,
we are able to provide estimates for a longer period from 1985–1997 determining also
the trend in NUD. In addition, our prediction is based on individual data capturing
the distribution of characteristics within an industry in a better way. The estimated
year specific β–coefficients can directly be used for the years 1985, 1989, and 1993.
For the remaining years the coefficients in the two nearest years, for which estimation
took place, are linearly interpolated. The prediction uses the available information in
the IABS data to construct the individual specific effect. The correspondence between
the industry information available in the IABS and the industry classification of the
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GSOEP can be found in table 9.
After predicting the estimates for the individuals available in the IABS, we regressed
the probability of being a union member on industry dummies for each year from 1985–
1997. These regressions are computed as weighted OLS, where the single individual
observation is weighted by the duration of employment in the corresponding year. Table
8 provides the estimated NUDs for 46 industries which are the dummy coefficients of
the aforementioned regression.
Our results show that the estimated NUDs are fairly constant between 1985 and 1989.
In most industries, the NUD is decreasing continuously between 1989 and 1997. In
all industries the NUD is lower in 1997 than in 1985 (and in 1989). On average over
the years considered, the NUD varies between 18.3 % in sector 34 (Music Instruments,
Toys, Fountain Pens) and 57.8 % in sector 21 (Iron) in the manufacturing sector. In
most of the non–manufacturing sectors, the NUDs are considerably lower on average
with values between 9.6 % in sector 66 (Health and Veterinary) and 25.9 % in sector
55 (Ship Traffic, Waterways).
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes union membership among employees in West Germany based on
the German Socioeconomic Panel in the years 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1998. We estimate
a correlated random effects probit model as suggested by Chamberlain (1984) to take
proper account of individual specific effect. One specification of the estimated models
is used to predict union density at the industry level based on the IAB employment
subsample (IABS). Our results suggest that at the individual level the propensity to
be a union member has not changed considerably over time. Therefore, the aggregate
decline in membership is due to composition effects. We also find a strong decline of
net union density at the industry level during the 1990’s based on the predicted union
membership for the IABS data, i.e. the composition effect is also strongly working
within industries. Our results suggest that unions have not become more attractive for
the types of workers who traditionally have a low propensity to be a union member
and whose share has been increasing continuously over time. In order to stop the
decline in aggregate union membership, unions would have to be much more successful
in recruiting these types of workers.
A Data
Our analysis is based on the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representa-
tive random sample of German households, which covers the years 1984–1998. In the
14
initial random sample of households in 1984, foreign households in Germany were over-
sampled. Among other things, household members aged 16 or older are interviewed
regarding demographic issues related to the interview year and questions concerning
their working life and their value orientation. In addition to the basic questions each
interview contains additional issues, ascertained not every year. Only in 1985, 1989,
1993, and 1998, one of these issues was membership in a trade union. Consequently, the
empirical analysis is restricted to these years. We consider persons in gainful employ-
ment only, because our analysis is focusing on the determinants of union membership
decision among employees and the determination of the share of unionized workers at
the industry level (NUD). For comparability over time, only West Germans are in-
cluded in the empirical analysis. The resulting sample consists of 6623 individuals for
whom the relevant information is available at least for one of the four mentioned years.
Over the different years, the number of observations varies between 3271 in 1998 and
4265 in 1989.
The remarkable decline of the share of union members and foreigners in 1998 may at
least partly be caused by the high panel mortality in this year. During the period of
observation the education level increases considerably. Whereas the average age of the
participants in the SOEP is somewhat higher at the end of the period observed, work-
ers’ satisfaction is slightly decreasing over time. The earnings variable is defined as
gross earnings in the last month in thousands of DM in prices of 1985. As can be seen
in table 9 the 35 industries reported in the SOEP are grouped into the 17 industries
used in the empirical analysis.
The IAB employment subsample (IABS ≡ “IAB–Bescha¨ftigtenstichprobe”) is a 1%
random sample from German social security accounts. The new release of the IABS
covering the years 1975–1997 has only recently been made available by the research
institute of the Federal Employment Service (“Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt– und Berufs-
forschung”) in Nu¨rnberg. In contrast to common survey data, the information con-
tained in the IABS is highly reliable because the data are collected to calculate the
pensions of retired people. The main features of the data set and a users’ guide can
be found in Bender et al. (1996).4 Social security contributions are mandatory for em-
ployees who earn more than a minimum wage threshold (“geringfu¨gige Bescha¨ftigung”)
and who are working regularly. The main exceptions are governmental civil servants
(“Beamte”) and self–employed, who do not pay any social security contributions. Stu-
dents who work less than 20 hours a week on a regular basis or less than 6 weeks
full–time are also excluded from the mandatory contributions. About 80% of the Ger-
man employees are covered by this mandatory pension system.
4This guide describes the first release of the IABS comprising the time period 1975 to 1990. The
construction of the data set is basically the same for the two data sets. Further information about
the newer version can also be found in Bender et al. (2000).
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The basic information in the IABS consists of social security insurance spells compris-
ing the starting point and the end of an employment spell, the average daily gross
wage (excluding employers’ contributions) and socioeconomic characteristics. To ob-
tain monthly earnings, the daily wage is multiplied by 30. For our prediction, an annual
wage observation is calculated as the weighted average of the wage observations for the
individual across all spells in the same industry within one year where the spell length
is used as the weight. With multiple spells (jobs) at the same time, cf. Bender et al.
(1996, p.74), we take the sum of the daily wages across spells as the wage observation
and treat the individual as full–employed. If an individual was employed in different
industries within one year, the spells are grouped by industry. This means that sev-
eral observations for the same person within a year are possible. The annual wage
observations are then weighted by the total employment spell length as percentage of
the whole year. High-skilled workers (with a technical college or university degree) are
dropped from the data set, because wages above the upper social security threshold
(“Beitragsbemessungsgrenze”) are not reported reliably. The resulting sample consists
of about 3.1 million observations during the period 1985–1997.
Table 2: Description of dummy variables
Dummy equals 1
MEMBER if observed person is a union member
FEMALE for females
MARRIED for married and cohabiting persons
FOREIGNER for foreigners
Education:
APPRENTICESHIP if apprenticeship or a similar vocational training is the highest
professional training degree
ABITUR if the highest educational degree is “Abitur”
UNIVERSITY if the highest educational degree is a technical college
(“Fachhochschule”) or a university degree
Party preferences:
CHRISTIAN–DEMOCRAT if the person feels close to the christian democratic party
(conservatives)
SOCIAL–DEMOCRAT if the person feels close to the social democratic party
Vocational status: if observed person is
PART–TIME WORKING ... full–time working
SEMI–SKILLED ... unskilled or semi–skilled blue–collar worker
SKILLED ... skilled blue–collar worker
WHITE–COLLAR ... white–collar worker
Firm size: for employees in firms with
...< 20 ... less than 20 employees
...20 – 199 ... 20 up to 199 employees
continued on next page ...
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Dummy equals 1
...200 – 1999 ... 200 up to 1999 employees
...≥ 2000 ... more than 2000 employees
CIVIL SERVICE ... employed in the civil service
Industry if the industry in which the person works is
SECTOR 01 ... Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Mining,
Energy and Water Supply
SECTOR 02 ... Chemical Products
SECTOR 03 ... Synthetic Materials
SECTOR 04 ... Stone and Earth Products
SECTOR 05 ... Iron–, Steel– or Metal–Industry, Machinery and
Vehicle Construction
SECTOR 06 ... Electric Appliances and Precision Instruments
SECTOR 07 ... Woodwork, Paper, Printing and Publishing
SECTOR 08 ... Textiles and Apparel
SECTOR 09 ... Food, Beverages and Tobacco
SECTOR 10 ... Construction
SECTOR 11 ... Trade
SECTOR 12 ... Railways or Postal Services
SECTOR 13 ... Other Transportation
SECTOR 14 ... Credit and Insurance Companies
SECTOR 15 ... Catering and Hotels, Private Households, Private Non–Profit
Organizations, Public Sector (Government, Social Insurance)
and Other Services
SECTOR 16 ... Education and Science
SECTOR 17 ... Healthcare System
Table 3: Description of other variables
Variable description
AGE Age of observed person divided by 10
AGE2 AGE squared
EARNINGS Total earnings last month in thousands of DM,
constant prices (1985 = 100)
EARNINGS2 EARNINGS squared
TENURE Duration of employment in the current firm, in years
SATISFACTION Satisfaction of the worker with his job,
scaled from 0 (not satisfied) to 10 (very satisfied)
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of dummy variables
Variable 1985 1989 1993 1998
frequency in % frequency in % frequency in % frequency in %
MEMBER 1080 29.9 1189 27.9 1001 27.1 717 21.9
FEMALE 1353 37.4 1685 39.5 1493 40.4 1357 41.5
MARRIED 2477 68.5 2745 64.3 2472 66.9 2096 64.1
FOREIGNER 1072 29.7 1262 29.6 1080 29.2 783 23.9
Education:
APPRENTICESHIP 2201 60.9 2647 62.1 2362 63.9 2300 70.3
ABITUR 144 4.0 264 6.2 327 8.8 401 12.3
UNIVERSITY 239 6.6 299 7.0 308 8.3 408 12.5
Party preferences:
CHRISTIAN–DEMOCRAT 665 18.4 824 19.3 448 12.1 366 11.2
SOCIAL–DEMOCRAT 1111 30.7 1276 29.9 804 21.8 809 24.7
Vocational status:
PART–TIME WORKING 549 15.2 720 16.9 636 17.2 44 1.3
BLUE–COLLAR WORKER:
SEMI–SKILLED 790 21.9 828 19.4 701 19.0 563 17.2
SKILLED 32 0.9 32 0.8 41 1.1 34 1.0
WHITE–COLLAR WORKER 1417 39.2 1773 41.6 1646 44.5 1766 54.0
CIVIL SERVICE 695 19.2 759 17.8 702 19.0 661 20.2
Firm Size:
< 20 751 20.8 947 22.2 856 23.2 846 25.9
20–199 1021 28.2 1152 27.0 949 25.7 831 25.4
200–1999 878 24.3 1102 25.8 958 25.9 851 26.0
≥ 2000 964 26.7 1064 24.9 932 25.2 743 22.7
Sector:
SECTOR 01 135 3.7 188 4.4 284 7.7 294 9.0
SECTOR 02 145 4.0 153 3.6 167 4.5 149 4.6
SECTOR 03 63 1.7 84 2.0 55 1.5 32 1.0
SECTOR 04 67 1.9 58 1.4 36 1.0 35 1.1
SECTOR 05 695 19.2 878 20.6 649 17.6 456 13.9
SECTOR 06 253 7.0 357 8.4 227 6.1 181 5.5
SECTOR 07 128 3.5 152 3.6 130 3.5 92 2.8
SECTOR 08 128 3.5 146 3.4 94 2.5 49 1.5
SECTOR 09 150 4.2 150 3.5 108 2.9 81 2.5
SECTOR 10 330 9.1 321 7.5 310 8.4 220 6.7
SECTOR 11 355 9.8 396 9.3 402 10.9 431 13.2
SECTOR 12 58 1.6 52 1.2 53 1.4 27 0.8
SECTOR 13 90 2.5 108 2.5 107 2.9 127 3.9
SECTOR 14 120 3.3 163 3.8 154 4.2 173 5.3
SECTOR 15 569 15.7 694 16.3 519 14.0 505 15.4
SECTOR 16 146 4.0 134 3.1 151 4.1 147 4.5
SECTOR 17 182 5.0 231 5.4 249 6.7 272 8.3
Number of Observations 3614 4265 3695 3271
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Table 5: Statistics of other variables
1985 1989 1993 1998
AGE Mean 38.00 37.65 39.03 39.22
(in years) Std.dev. 11.54 11.90 11.49 10.56
Min. 17 17 17 19
Max. 65 65 65 65
EARNINGS Mean 2637 2862 3117 3327
(DM per month Std.dev. 1374 1592 1740 1861
in 1985 prices) Min. 0 0 96 0
Max. 15000 25962 31461 23041
TENURE Mean 9.77 9.73 10.68 9.89
Std.dev. 8.32 8.77 9.04 9.06
Min. 0 0 0 0
Max. 44 46 50 50
SATISFACTION Mean 7.57 7.25 7.10 7.01
Std.dev. 2.09 2.01 1.97 1.93
Min. 0 0 0 0
Max. 10 10 10 10
Table 6: Estimation results – Correlated Random Effects
Probit
Coefficient Year Specification
(1) (2) (3)
CONST -2.4770??? -2.8926??? -2.6389???
(0.241) (0.243) (0.262)
FEMALE -0.1210 ?? -0.1884??? -0.1216 ??
(0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
FOREIGNER 1985 -0.1396 ??
(0.636)
1989 -0.3436
-0.6681 (0.611) -0.1122 ??
1993 (0.050) -0.0655 (0.050)
(0.064)
1998 -0.2529???
(0.064)
AGE 0.3092??? 0.3371??? 0.3249???
(0.082) (0.091) (0.093)
AGE2 -0.0313??? -0.0338??? -0.0377???
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
MARRIED -0.0312 -0.0451 -0.0630
(0.044) (0.047) (0.047)
continued on next page ...
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Coefficient Year Specification
(1) (2) (3)
CHRISTIAN–DEMOCRAT -0.0698 — -0.0265
(0.052) (0.057)
SOCIAL–DEMOCRAT 0.0718 ?? — 0.1119???
(0.031) (0.034)
APPRENTICESHIP 0.0519 0.0853 ? 0.0666
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
ABITUR -0.1606 ?? -0.0545 -0.1501 ?
(0.082) (0.088) (0.086)
UNIVERSITY 1985 -0.0373
(0.129)
1989 0.0061
-0.2162 ?? (0.113) -0.0063
1993 (0.093) 0.0813 (0.095)
(0.109)
1998 -0.2499 ??
(0.111)
SEMI–SKILLED 1985 0.2063???
BLUE–COLLAR (0.075)
WORKER 1989 -0.0643
0.0828 ? 0.1456??? (0.070)
1993 (0.050) (0.053) 0.2842???
(0.080)
1998 0.0460
(0.090)
SKILLED BLUE– -0.0065 0.2642 0.0847
COLLAR WORKER (0.213) (0.218) (0.227)
WHITE–COLLAR 1985 0.0411
WORKER (0.074)
1989 -0.0919
-0.0364 -0.0205 (0.067)
1993 (0.041) (0.052) 0.1398 ??
(0.065)
1998 0.0725
(0.075)
CIVIL SERVICE — 0.1422 ?? 0.1382 ??
(0.061) (0.062)
PART–TIME -0.3853??? -0.3317??? -0.2966???
WORKING (0.059) (0.066) (0.069)
SATISFACTION -0.0098 — -0.0185 ??
(0.007) (0.008)
EARNINGS 1985 -0.0568
(0.060)
continued on next page ...
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Coefficient Year Specification
(1) (2) (3)
1989 0.0197
0.0257 -0.0406 (0.053)
1993 (0.031) (0.034) -0.0251
(0.043)
1998 -0.0425
(0.041)
EARNINGS2 1985 0.0027
(0.008)
1989 -0.0047
-0.0062 ? -0.0010 (0.007)
1993 (0.003) (0.003) -0.0035
(0.004)
1998 -0.0011
(0.004)
TENURE — — 0.0020
(0.005)
FIRM SIZE 1985 — 0.3357??? 0.3289???
20–199 (0.074) (0.085)
1989 — 0.2978??? 0.3071???
(0.068) (0.080)
1993 — 0.2442??? 0.2320???
(0.068) (0.083)
1998 — 0.3977??? 0.4184???
(0.079) (0.094)
FIRM SIZE 1985 — 0.3735???
200–1999 (0.086)
1989 — 0.3224???
0.3814??? (0.086)
1993 — (0.063) 0.3729???
(0.088)
1998 — 0.4022???
(0.091)
FIRM SIZE 1985 — 0.3850??? 0.4046???
≥ 2000 (0.074) (0.089)
1989 — 0.3779??? 0.4046???
(0.069) (0.091)
1993 — 0.3858??? 0.3872???
(0.070) (0.089)
1998 — 0.4759??? 0.5107???
(0.079) (0.097)
SECTOR 02 — 0.1449 ? 0.0709
(0.086) (0.089)
continued on next page ...
21
... continued from previous page
Coefficient Year Specification
(1) (2) (3)
SECTOR 03 — -0.0820 -0.0783
(0.112) (0.109)
SECTOR 04 — -0.0150 -0.0417
(0.146) (0.143)
SECTOR 05 — 0.2849??? 0.2482???
(0.050) (0.050)
SECTOR 06 1985 — -0.2279 ?? -0.1483 ?
(0.099) (0.087)
1989 — -0.3445??? -0.3209???
(0.092) (0.084)
1993 — -0.2209 ?? -0.1145
(0.105) (0.100)
1998 — 0.1609 0.0201
(0.119) (0.101)
SECTOR 07 — 0.1867 ? 0.0987
(0.098) (0.099)
SECTOR 08 — 0.1682 0.2562 ??
(0.108) (0.114)
SECTOR 09 — -0.0484 -0.0048
(0.106) (0.102)
SECTOR 10 — -0.2803??? -0.3624???
(0.084) (0.086)
SECTOR 11 — -0.1171 ? -0.1137
(0.068) (0.071)
SECTOR 12 1985 — 1.0477???
(0.220)
1989 — 0.9847???
(0.191) 0.8703???
1993 — 1.0875??? (0.167)
(0.190)
1998 — 0.7551???
(0.206)
SECTOR 13 — -0.0791 -0.0922
(0.100) (0.098)
SECTOR 14 — -0.3788??? -0.2709 ??
(0.115) (0.112)
SECTOR 15 — -0.1475 ?? -0.1821???
(0.059) (0.059)
SECTOR 16 — -0.2102 ? -0.1027
(0.111) (0.108)
SECTOR 17 — -0.4345??? -0.4377???
(0.109) (0.111)
continued on next page ...
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Coefficient Year Specification
(1) (2) (3)
α 1989 1.0349??? 1.0251??? 1.0454???
(.041) (.0345) (.047487)
1993 1.0275??? .9840??? 1.01173???
(.046) (.0411) (.0523)
1998 1.0731??? 1.0028??? 1.0084???
(.058) (.0461) (.0569)
λEARNINGS 1985 .0812
??? .036406??? -.719978E-02
(.0636) (.069084) (.069006)
1989 .3760??? .316600??? .250588???
(.0710) (.073010) (.074604)
1993 .0186??? -.04224??? -.052744???
(.0505) (.055690) (.052017)
1998 .1865??? .219964??? .181576???
(.0439) (.046414) (.048122)
λEARNINGS2 1985 -.865545E-03
??? .157870E-02 ??? .012688 ???
(.997658E-02) (.010473) (.010399)
1989 -.048948 ??? -.047278 ??? -.03586 ???
(.981892E-02) ( .010428) (.010717)
1993 .105319E-02??? .306723E-02 ??? -.278657E-03???
(.541703E-02) (.595004E-02) (.558145E-02)
1998 -.014635 ??? -.015401??? -.012771 ???
(.424500E-02) ( .432960E-02) (.430330E-02)
λWHITE−COLLAR 1985 -.123902??? -.087790??? -.136326???
(.064619) ( .067188) (.066737)
1989 -.187868??? -.187549??? -.221675???
(.066741) ( .074323) (.069247)
1993 -.064190??? -.165185??? -.144594???
(.068868) ( .076844) (.073582)
1998 -.121708??? -.110550??? -.176727???
(.066979) ( .067638) (.072736)
λSOCIAL−DEMOCRAT 1985 .082700??? — .140406???
(.054686) (.050890)
1989 .157362??? — .169309???
(.060187) (.056210)
1993 .101737??? — .031627???
(.061017) (.061384)
1998 .205703??? — .257539???
(.055829) (.057592)
λFIRM SIZE20−199 1985 — .136432??? .158727 ???
(.070558) (.069391)
1989 — .169901??? .262790 ???
(.073186) (.073291)
continued on next page ...
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Coefficient Year Specification
(1) (2) (3)
1993 — .235614??? .223318 ???
(.086371) (.085739)
1998 — -.161325??? -.230342???
(.088101) (.086234)
λFIRM SIZE200−1999 1985 — .388755??? .281453 ???
(.078687) (.078828)
1989 — .246569??? .386364 ???
(.080137) (.080796)
1993 — .126669??? .101398 ???
(.082776) (.085485)
1998 — .022978??? -.015826 ?
(.081444) (.086694)
λFIRM SIZE≥2000 1985 — .371683 ??? .296972 ???
(.083884) (.083989)
1989 — .461777 ??? .531305 ???
(.086256) (.089421)
1993 — .242391 ??? .248481 ???
(.093663) (.096458)
1998 — -.176953??? -.237742???
(.091472) (.095571)
λCIV IL SERV ICE 1985 — .162532
??? .179336 ???
(.081787) (.078522)
1989 — -.578834E-03 -.025583???
(.087361) (.088830)
1993 — -.293504??? -.341095???
(.092761) (.089356)
1998 — .381668 ??? .420545 ???
(.085450) (.082523)
λTENURE 1985 — — .019793
???
(.476239E-02)
1989 — — -.014059 ???
(.454028E-02)
1993 — — .301885E-02???
(.381814E-02)
1998 — — .512082E-02???
(.322674E-02)
Number of Obs. 1985 3115 3042 3000
1989 3118 3045 3003
1993 3118 3044 3002
1998 3119 3045 3003
? , ?? , ??? mark significant coefficients to the 10%, 5%, 1% level; standard errors in
parentheses.
a: If a coefficient is restricted to be constant over time there is no year information. In
addition, all specification include year specific dummy variables for missing values in the
earnings and the satisfaction (only specification 1 and 3) variables.
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Table 7: Results of Wald tests for time variability of
estimated coefficients
Specification
Variable (1) (2) (3)
CONST 1.8391 3.0454 3.1103
(0.606) (0.385) (0.375)
FEMALE 0.8778 6.0600 5.4996
(0.831) (0.109) (0.139)
FOREIGNER 6.3483 8.8271 5.2608
(0.096) (0.032) (0.154)
AGE, AGE2 5.0144 4.6275 6.2120
(0.542) (0.592) (0.400)
MARRIED 2.5813 2.0514 3.0191
(0.461) (0.562) (0.389)
PARTY PREFERENCES 4.3657 — 6.7787
(0.627) (0.342)
APPRENTICESHIP 4.4692 3.7697 7.4955
(0.215) (0.287) (0.058)
ABITUR, UNIVERSITY 6.3204 15.2224 12.0014
(0.388) (0.018) (0.062)
BLUE–COLLAR/ 8.8908 6.4671 18.4404
WHITE–COLLAR WORKER (0.447) (0.692) (0.030)
PART–TIME WORKING 4.6641 2.3507 6.9346
(0.198) (0.503) (0.074)
SATISFACTION 4.9129 — 0.8141
(0.178) (0.846)
EARNINGS, EARNINGS2 7.7489 10.7364 14.0308
(0.257) (0.097) (0.029)
TENURE — — 5.8984
(0.117)
FIRM–SIZE — 16.8936 21.7201
(0.050) (0.010)
CIVIL SERVICE — 1.9562 1.9562
(0.582) (0.582)
SECTOR — 49.1123 46.6824
(0.428) (0.527)
χ2–test–statistics with P-values in paranthesis
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Table 8: Estimates of annual net union density for 46 in-
dustries
Industry year
No. Description 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
06 Electricity, Gas, .444 .452 .464 .478 .493 .465 .437 .411 .387 .367 .362 .358 .352
Heat and Water
10 Mining .535 .552 .572 .600 .624 .597 .575 .559 .538 .510 .509 .511 .511
14 Chemical Products .441 .438 .434 .434 .432 .420 .411 .404 .397 .379 .367 .363 .354
15 Petroleum Processing .445 .427 .431 .433 .436 .420 .408 .407 .401 .388 .379 .364 .356
16 Synthetic Materials .283 .278 .274 .276 .276 .264 .256 .252 .252 .245 .232 .223 .213
17 Rubber Products .369 .366 .362 .366 .366 .353 .341 .333 .334 .314 .301 .300 .290
18 Stone and Earth .282 .277 .277 .276 .278 .269 .260 .254 .248 .250 .237 .227 .217
Products
19 Fine Ceramics .336 .330 .329 .333 .331 .322 .312 .311 .309 .296 .281 .272 .260
20 Glass and Products .373 .375 .373 .376 .375 .360 .347 .341 .339 .324 .315 .314 .307
21 Iron .584 .589 .602 .610 .612 .597 .590 .584 .581 .553 .546 .543 .524
22 Non–Ferrous Metals .496 .495 .494 .492 .485 .468 .457 .452 .453 .435 .418 .412 .406
23 Foundry .492 .488 .492 .496 .494 .478 .468 .464 .462 .448 .424 .416 .404
24 Fabricated Metal .402 .400 .396 .395 .392 .380 .369 .365 .359 .350 .336 .326 .312
Products
25 Steel, Light Metal .397 .391 .390 .390 .387 .374 .365 .356 .349 .349 .337 .324 .308
and Tracked Vehicles
26 Machinery .474 .468 .466 .467 .462 .448 .438 .433 .429 .422 .408 .399 .392
27 Office and Data .260 .243 .227 .214 .203 .201 .202 .210 .209 .270 .239 .204 .179
Processing Machines
28 Vehicles and Repairs .515 .512 .510 .511 .510 .498 .482 .475 .470 .457 .444 .435 .424
29 Shipbuilding .539 .545 .552 .550 .561 .554 .537 .536 .532 .524 .512 .487 .487
30 Air and Space .500 .495 .492 .489 .485 .478 .474 .473 .471 .442 .418 .413 .415
31 Electric Appliances .276 .261 .251 .243 .233 .233 .235 .242 .249 .324 .291 .263 .232
and Repairs
32 Precision and Optical .226 .213 .205 .195 .190 .190 .194 .195 .199 .276 .243 .212 .183
Instruments
33 Iron, Sheet Metal and .255 .244 .235 .226 .216 .216 .215 .220 .229 .317 .282 .250 .218
Metal Products
34 Music Instruments, .192 .181 .177 .172 .162 .158 .159 .168 .173 .252 .223 .194 .164
Toys, Fountain Pens
35 Woodwork .338 .336 .336 .333 .331 .322 .314 .310 .305 .306 .294 .285 .275
36 Wood Processing .338 .336 .336 .333 .332 .322 .314 .310 .305 .306 .294 .285 .275
37 Pulp, Paper and Board .417 .412 .406 .408 .408 .394 .381 .379 .378 .378 .365 .356 .342
38 Paper and Products .417 .412 .405 .408 .408 .394 .381 .379 .378 .378 .365 .355 .342
39 Printing and .349 .344 .342 .339 .337 .325 .317 .312 .310 .314 .304 .295 .283
Publishing
40 Leather .313 .311 .312 .314 .312 .305 .296 .290 .284 .274 .259 .247 .231
41 Textiles .364 .362 .365 .368 .368 .356 .346 .343 .339 .331 .315 .301 .286
42 Apparel .285 .283 .282 .285 .285 .280 .274 .271 .268 .271 .254 .233 .217
43 Food .219 .216 .214 .212 .214 .208 .202 .200 .198 .195 .184 .176 .164
44 Beverages .306 .298 .296 .296 .293 .288 .282 .280 .275 .280 .265 .251 .242
45 Tobacco .299 .298 .301 .297 .295 .285 .284 .281 .278 .268 .259 .255 .264
46 Construction .200 .198 .197 .197 .196 .189 .183 .179 .174 .174 .165 .156 .148
50 Trade .143 .138 .135 .133 .129 .127 .126 .125 .123 .125 .118 .110 .102
54 Railways .772 .769 .765 .765 .764 .762 .749 .740 .738 .656 .672 .641 .660
55 Ship Traffic, .272 .270 .264 .275 .278 .267 .265 .263 .262 .247 .241 .239 .219
Waterways
56 German Postal .702 .694 .689 .683 .669 .669 .659 .661 .659 .570 .571 .554 .566
continued on next page...
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...continued from previous page
Industry year
No. Description 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Services
57 Other Transportation .230 .226 .224 .223 .221 .213 .205 .202 .200 .198 .185 .175 .165
60 Credit Institutions .123 .118 .114 .111 .107 .105 .103 .102 .102 .099 .095 .092 .090
61 Insurance Companies .123 .118 .114 .111 .107 .105 .103 .102 .102 .099 .095 .092 .090
64 Catering and Hotels .127 .126 .126 .125 .124 .122 .120 .118 .117 .113 .104 .095 .086
65 Educations, Research .150 .144 .140 .137 .134 .129 .125 .122 .120 .111 .107 .100 .093
and Culture
66 Health and Veterinary .119 .113 .109 .107 .103 .100 .096 .093 .091 .082 .080 .076 .073
67 Other Services .131 .127 .126 .124 .123 .121 .121 .120 .118 .112 .108 .102 .096
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Table 9: Industry Classification in SOEP and National Accounts
No.a Industry SOEPb NAc
01 Agriculture and Forestry 01 01
01 Fisheries 02 01
01 Energy and Water Supply 03 06
01 Mining 04 10
02 Chemical Products 05 14,15
03 Synthetic Materials 06 16,17
04 Stone and Earth Products 07 18–20
05 Iron and Steel 08 21,24,25,33
05 Machinery and Vehicle Construction 09 26,28–30
06 Electric Appliances and Precision Instruments 10 27,31,32,34
07 Woodwork, Paper, Printing and Publishing 11 35–39
08 Textiles and Apparel 12 40–42
09 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 13 43–45
10 Construction 14 46
10 Building extension and conversion 15 46
11 Wholesale Trade 16 50
11 Commercial Mediation 17 50
11 Retail Trade 18 50
12 Railways 19 54
12 Postal Services 20 56
13 Other Transportation 21 55,57
14 Credit Institutions 22 60
14 Insurance Companies 23 61
15 Catering and Hotels 24 64
15 Personal Services 25 67
15 Cleaning and Waste Disposal 26 67
15 Legal Advice, Immovables 29 67
15 Other Services 30 67
15 Private Non–Profit Organizations 31 67
15 Private Households 32 67
15 Government 33 67
15 Social Insurance 34 67
15 Other Industries 35 67
16 Education and Science 27 65,70
17 Healthcare System 28 66
a: Industry classification used in the empirical analysis.
b: Industry classification used in the SOEP data set.
c: Industry classification used in the National Accounts of the German Statistical Office
(“Statistisches Bundesamt”, FS 18, R 1.3).
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